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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the connection between the history of
colonial rule and postcolonial development in Africa. We focus on
the fact that many African colonies were governed by indirect rule.
Under indirect rule, indigenous people are divided into two groups: a
privileged ruling group and an unprivileged ruled group. Our model
assumes that the ruled group cannot observe how their deprived re-
sources are divided between the metropolitan ruler and the ruling
group. In this economy, a large level of exploitation by the metropoli-
tan ruler yields distrust among indigenous groups and creates a neg-
ative eﬀect on postcolonial economic and political development.
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Many researchers have studied the connection between colonial legacies and
postcolonial development. In relation to these connections, Bertocchi and
Canova (2002) found that exploitation activities by a metropolitan ruler have
a negative impact on the growth rates of postcolonial African countries. They
also found that the identity of the colonial power is directly related to growth
rates after independence in these countries. Lange (2004) focused on the
distinction between direct and indirect rule, and found that the degree of
indirect rule has a negative impact on postcolonial political development in
British colonies.
Motivated by these empirical studies, this paper builds a model to high-
light the relationship between colonial experience and economic and polit-
ical development after independence in Africa. We focus on the fact that
most African colonies were governed by indirect rule in the colonial era. We
show that, under indirect rule, exploitation activities by the metropolitan
ruler yield distrust between the indigenous privileged class and other peo-
ple, harming postcolonial economic and political development in Africa. The
argument of this paper is highly motivated by the history of colonial and
postcolonial Africa. We link poor economic performance after independence
to the history of African politics and provide a plausible explanation on the
causes of some historical events such as the conﬂicts in Rwanda, Burundi,
and Zanzibar.
The basic ideas of the model are as follows. We consider an economy
which reﬂects African history during the colonial period and after indepen-
dence. In the colonial period, which corresponds to the ﬁrst stage in the
model, there exist a metropolitan ruler and two indigenous groups. The
metropolitan ruler appoints one group to a ruling position. Therefore, the
indigenous people are divided into a privileged ruling group and an unpriv-
ileged ruled group. The metropolitan ruler instructs the ruling group to
transfer the resources of the indigenous people to the metropolitan ruler.
This setup captures the indirect rule in the colony.
Using the political power given by the metropolitan ruler, the ruling group
can exploit the resources of the ruled group for its own consumption. There-
fore, the resources of the ruled group are transferred to both the metropoli-
tan ruler and the ruling group. The level of exploitation by the ruling group
depends upon the ruling group’s preferences, and, most importantly, its “al-
truism” for the ruled group.
1The information structure of the economy is as follows. The ruled group
cannot observe how many resources are transferred to the ruling group, but
can observe the total amount of deprived resources. This is because the
resources of the ruled group that are transferred to the metropolitan ruler
are collected by the ruling group. The degree of altruism of the ruling group is
also assumed not to be observable by the ruled group. The ruled group infers
the degree of altruism of the ruling group by observing the total amount of
deprived resources. Harsh exploitation by the metropolitan ruler yields the
ruled group’s distrust of the ruling group.
In the period after independence, which corresponds to the second stage
in the model, the metropolitan ruler leaves the economy. The ruling group
retains political power and controls the government. The ruled group takes
over the belief from the colonial period and, based on this belief, forms ex-
pectations about the policy which the ruling group adopts. The tyranny of
the metropolitan ruler makes the ruled group suspicious of the ruling group
and leads to ineﬃcient activities of the ruled group, such as underinvestment
and revolt.
This paper is related to several works that focused on the connection be-
tween colonial experience and economic development. In addition to Bertoc-
chi and Canova (2002) and Lange (2004), Acemoglu et al. (2001), Grier
(1999), and Nunn (2007) investigated the eﬀect of colonial legacies on eco-
nomic performance. Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Grier (1999) showed clear
channels in which experience in the colonial era aﬀects postcolonial develop-
ment. Acemoglu et al. (2001) argued that extractive institutions were built
by colonial powers in regions such as Africa where there was little settlement
of Europeans, and that the colonial institutions shape current institutions
and aﬀect income per capita. Grier (1999) found that former British colonies
have better economic performance than former French colonies, and that the
diﬀerence can be largely explained by the educational level at independence.
In this paper, we consider an alternative channel that connects the colo-
nial experience with economic and political development after independence
in Africa. Nunn (2007) provided a model explaining the connection be-
tween colonial experience and underdevelopment in Africa adopting a diﬀer-
ent mechanism than ours. In Nunn’s multiple equilibrium model, indigenous
people choose between production and being rent-seekers. Nuun has shown
that when exploitation by the metropolitan ruler is severe, those who engage
in production gradually convert to rent-seeking. Since high rent-seeking (low
production) equilibrium is stable, the economy continues to converge to the
2high rent-seeking equilibrium even after independence.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the history of colonial and postcolonial Africa that is related to the argument
of this paper. Section 3 includes the construction and analyses of the model.
Finally, Section 4 presents the conclusions of the paper.
2 History of colonial and postcolonial Africa
In this section, we describe the history of Africa relevant to the argument
presented in the following sections. First, we describe the form of colonial
rule exercised by the European countries and then discuss how the legacies
of the colonial period have aﬀected the economic and political development
of postcolonial African countries.
2.1 Colonial rule in Africa
The feature of colonial rule in Africa that is relevant for the discussion in this
paper is indirect rule, which is the manner of rule in which a metropolitan
ruler appoints local chiefs to conduct administrative tasks such as tax col-
lection and maintenance of law and order in their territory. In some cases,
traditional local authorities in Africa were reorganized for such governance,
and in other cases, the positions of the chiefs were newly imposed (Mamdani
1996; Betts and Asiwaju 1985).
As argued by many scholars, most African colonies were governed by
indirect rule 1(Beck 2001; Betts and Asiwaju 1985; Crowder 1964; Mam-
dani 1996). Although Crowder (1964) pointed out diﬀerences in the man-
ner of British and French colonial rule, he stated that “both powers had
little alternative to the use of existing political authorities as a means of
governing their vast African empires, and in most cases these authorities
were headed by chiefs”(p.197). 2 Lange (2004) stated that “While the
British–and particularly, Lord Lugard–have been credited with inventing in-
direct rule, the French, Portuguese, and Belgians all used indirect forms of
1Although indirect rule was broadly used in colonial Africa, there are some examples
of direct rule, such as Lagos, Freetown, and Dakar, among others. Direct rule was used in
the beginning of colonial administration and urban civil society (Mamdani 1996).
2French colonial policy shifted from direct rule to indirect rule in the late 19th and
early 20th centuries (Bleich 2005; Mamdani 1996).
3rule”(p.908). Beck (2001) also stated that “indirect rule was practised in
varying forms throughout colonial Africa” and that this view is “now widely
accepted”(p.604).
Indirect rule was the general method adopted to govern the African
colonies for several seasons. Since the territory of the African colonies cov-
ered a large area and expanded rapidly, it was too expensive for metropolitan
rulers to rule the colonies directly by sending oﬃcers from the home coun-
tries. The climate of most of the African continent, which the Europeans
did not ﬁnd suitable for intensive settlement with exceptions such as Algeria
and South Africa3, and the geographically dispersed distribution of the local
population were also reasons for the prevalence of the indirect rule (Betts
and Asiwaju 1985). As Young (2004) stated, indirect rule was required for
the low-cost management of the colonies.
The chiefs who occupied the ruling positions in the indirectly ruled regions
earned revenue from the direct exploitation of inhabitants in those regions.
The metropolitan ruler empowered the chiefs in administrative, legislative,
and judicial aspects, and local governance was based on informal customary
law. Therefore, the chiefs were able to use their power for their own in-
terests. Since the chiefs occupied intermediary positions that connected the
metropolitan ruler and the local population, they were able to extract the re-
sources transferred between the local population and the metropolitan ruler
(Lange 2004). These characteristics of the position and power of chiefs would
particularly apply to British colonies. Crowder (1964) compared British in-
direct rule to that of France and pointed out the following diﬀerences. In
British colonies, the chiefs and the oﬃcer from the metropolitan country had
an “advisory relationship”. Interference with the administration of chiefs
was minimized, and local tradition and customs were respected. On the
other hand, in French colonies, chiefs were subordinated to the oﬃcer from
the metropolitan country, and the duties and power of chiefs were clearly
deﬁned. Lange (2004), however, stated that, although French indirect rule
was more formal concerning the characteristics of chiefs and had less respect
for the local tradition compared to British indirect rule, “formalization still
placed chiefs in an intermediary position and gave them extreme power over
local aﬀairs while leaving the central administration incapacitated” (p.917).
3In 1920, about 4,000 British immigrants, who were ﬁnancially supported by the British
government, arrived on South Africa, and large numbers of immigrants followed them
(Thompson 2001). In Algeria, many French immigrants arrived in the colonial era, and
their share of the population reached 9.1% in 1921 (Miyaji 1978).
4The fact that chiefs could make use of their intermediary position to ex-
tract the resources of indigenous masses is important for the argument in the
following sections.
2.2 The political structure in postcolonial Africa
In many postcolonial states in Africa, the local elites formed by indirect
rule in the colonial era retained their privileged positions. Acemoglu et al.
(2001) wrote that “In many cases where European powers set up authoritar-
ian institutions, they delegated the day-to-day running of the state to a small
domestic elite. This narrow group often was the one to control the state after
independence and favored extractive institutions”(p. 1376). The power and
authority of the local elites were secured by postcolonial African governments
because the central governments in postcolonial Africa depended on the local
powerholders to gain electoral support (Boone 1998; Beck 2001). Further-
more, as in the cases of European colonial powers, postcolonial African states
needed to cooperate with the local powerholders to take control of the rural
regions (Berman 1998; Gennaioli and Rainer 2007).
There are many examples of African states sharing power with local elites
who served as intermediaries between colonial powers and indigenous people
under indirect rule. Under British rule, the Sierra Leone Protectorate was
ruled indirectly and administration was delegated to paramount chiefs and
sub-chiefs. 4 In spite of the British attempt to lower the power of chiefs in the
end of colonial era, the postcolonial government strengthened and protected
the authority of the paramount chief in each chiefdom after independence.
This is because national politicians required the electoral support of the
paramount chiefs, who had a strong inﬂuence on the local population, in
order to take the helm of the state (Fanthorpe 2001).
A similar structure existed in postcolonial Senegal. Beck (1997, 2001)
argued that the local authorities, who served as intermediaries between the
French and the indigenous people in the colonial period, were tied to the
central government and retained their authority after independence. Boone
(1998) stated that, under the postcolonial regime in Senegal, “a great deal
of discretion in policy implementation, and real prerogative over the use of
state authority and resources, was devolved to local powerbrokers”(p.14). A
4A paramount chief was a primary position in a chiefdom, which was a basic admin-
istrative unit, and a sub-chief conducted administrative tasks, such as tax collection, in
smaller administrative unit.
5similar connection between local powerholders and the central government
also existed in Mauritania, Niger, Chad, Nigeria, and Zaire under the rule of
Mobutu (Gennaioli and Rainer 2007; Nwaubani 1994; Tull 2003).
2.3 Postcolonial underdevelopment in Africa
Many studies have highlighted weak governance in Africa as a factor of poor
economic performance after independence. Accountability of the govern-
ment, democratic competition, property rights protection, prevention of cor-
ruption, and rule of law were lacking in many African countries, which made
politics in African countries favorable only for narrow elite groups. Accord-
ing to the argument of Acemoglu et al. (2001), the extractive institutions
built by colonial powers during the colonial period were inherited by the in-
digenous elite, and the resources of the masses were extracted by the elite
as in the colonial period. In such a situation, where the elite can exploit
the resources of the population with discretionary powers, the expectation of
producers that a large share of future output will be exploited by the elite
causes underinvestment and hinders economic development. Many studies
have shown signiﬁcant and substantial eﬀects of institutions (protection of
property right against infringement by the government or private agents) on
income and investment (Knack and Keefer1995; Mauro 1995; Hall and Jones
1999; Acemoglu et al. 2001; Rodrik et al. 2004). In this paper, we show that
the more tyrannical the policy of the metropolitan ruler during the colonial
period, the greater the producers’ expectations of exploitation by the elite,
resulting in a smaller level of investment after independence. This paper is
complementary to the studies mentioned above since the argument of this
paper shows that the colonial experience of severe exploitation by colonial
powers worsens the negative impact of bad institutions.
The argument of this paper is one possible explanation for the formation
of distrust among indigenous groups. This distrust originating from expe-
riences in the colonial period would be an important factor responsible for
some cases of postcolonial conﬂict in Africa. After a formal description of the
model, we demonstrate that the model can explain the conﬂicts in Rwanda,
Burundi, and Zanzibar.5
5There is a large literature on the causes of civil war and political instability in Sub-
Saharan Africa (see e.g. Sambanis 2002 for survey). Studies show a robust relationship
between poverty and the risk of insurgency (Collier and Hoeﬄer 2004; Fearon and Laitin
2003). Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004) found that natural resource dependence also matters
63 The model
We consider a two-stage model where the ﬁrst stage represents the colonial
period in Africa and the second stage represents the period after indepen-
dence. We assume that the independence is an exogenous and unexpected
event.6 There exist a metropolitan ruler and two indigenous groups. Since
all members of the same group are identical, we can treat each group as one
agent. The indigenous Group i = 1;2 owns endowments ei in each stage.
The members of each group live for two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, each
agent is unconcerned with the second stage since independence is unexpected
for the agents. The utility function for Group i, ui, is common to both of
the stages and is given by:




where ci is the consumption level of Group i. Note that the utility of Group
1 depends on the consumption level of Group 2. Group 1 is concerned with
the consumption level of Group 2 because of altruism for Group 2. The
parameter ¯¤ is the weight that Group 1 gives for Group 2. We can interpret
this parameter as the degree of altruism of Group 1. We assume that the
parameter ¯¤ is not observable for Group 2 and that Group 2 infers the value
of ¯¤ by observing the behavior of Group 1 as we will see below. 7 The degree
of altruism of Group 2 is assumed to be zero for simplicity.
3.1 First stage: Colonial period
In the ﬁrst stage, the metropolitan ruler appoints Group 1 to a ruling position
and requires the group to pay a certain amount of resources. Group 1 deprives
the endowments of Group 2 to meet the requirement of the metropolitan
ruler. In addition, using the political power given by the metropolitan ruler,
for civil war risk. One of the most surprising ﬁndings is that ethnic diversity does not
matter for civil war (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; Collier and Hoeﬄer 2004). In this
paper, we consider another hypothesis, which is that colonial experience aﬀects conﬂicts
in postcolonial Africa.
6We will brieﬂy discuss on this assumption in conclusion.
7The key mechanism of our model depends on the assumption that Group 2 does not
know the degree of altruism of Group 1. Therefore, it is not crucial whether Group 1 is
altruistic. That is, we do not exclude the case where ¯¤ is zero or negative.
7Group 1 can privately exploit the resources of Group 2. This setup captures
the system of indirect rule explained in the previous section.
Let ¿ and t denote the proportion of the endowments of Group 2 that is
transferred to the metropolitan ruler and Group 1, respectively. The level
of exploitation by the metropolitan ruler is given exogenously; therefore ¿
is an exogenous variable. The private exploitation involves costs, and the
cost function is given by t2
2∆e2. This cost captures various costs speciﬁc to
the private exploitation by Group 1. Group 1 may be punished if private
exploitation is detected by the metropolitan ruler. ∆ is a parameter that
represents how easy it is for Group 1 to exploit the resources of Group 2.
The larger ∆ is, the easier Group 1 can exploit the resources of Group 2. The
cost of private exploitation is proportional to the amount of endowments of
Group 2, e2. Then, the consumption of Group i, ci, can be written as:







c2 = (1 ¡ t ¡ ¿)e2:
(2)
Since Group 1 determines the level of exploitation to maximize its utility
without considering the eﬀect of the decision on circumstances after inde-










¤(1 ¡ t ¡ ¿)e2:
From the ﬁrst-order condition, the solution of the above problem is given
by:8
t = ∆(1 ¡ ¯
¤): (3)
Hence the amount of exploitation by Group 1 decreases in the degree of al-
truism of Group 1, ¯¤. Since the altruistic ruling group takes the welfare loss
of the ruled group due to exploitation seriously, the amount of exploitation
by the altruistic ruling group is relatively small.
3.2 Inference on the degree of altruism
Group 2 cannot observe how its deprived resources are divided between the
metropolitan ruler and Group 1. This is because the resources from Group
8We assume an interior solution. Note that the second-order condition is also satisﬁed.
82 that are transferred to the metropolitan ruler are also collected by Group
1. That is, Group 2 can observe the sum of the two rates t + ¿, but cannot
observe these rates separately.
Here, we assume that Group 2 builds its belief about the degree of altru-
ism of Group 1 according to the following process: Group 2 has a prior belief
about the amount of exploitation by the metropolitan ruler. Observing the
sum of the two rates, Group 2 builds a belief about the degree of altruism,
¯¤, so as to be consistent with the prior belief.
Let ˆ ¿ be the random variable representing the prior belief of Group 2
about the value of ¿, and we assume that the distribution of ˆ ¿ is given by:
ˆ ¿ » U[¿;¿]:
Since the rate of exploitation by Group 1 is t = ∆(1¡¯¤), the observed sum
of the two rates is ∆(1 ¡ ¯¤) + ¿. Therefore, the inferred degree of altruism
ˆ ¯, which is a random variable, satisﬁes the following condition:
∆(1 ¡ ¯
¤) + ¿ = ∆(1 ¡ ˆ ¯) + ˆ ¿:
The belief of Group 2 is built to be consistent with the entire amount of
exploitation that is observable for Group 2 and the prior belief of Group 2
about ¿. By rewriting this equation, we have:
ˆ ¯ = ¯
¤ +
ˆ ¿ ¡ ¿
∆
:
Hence, the belief of Group 2 about the degree of altruism (the distribution













where its expected value is:















Note that the distribution of ˆ ¯ and its expected value depend on ¿. As ¿
increases, the entire amount of exploitation observable for Group 2 increases,
9and the ruled group confuses the larger observed exploitation with the larger
private exploitation by the ruling group. Hence, in such a case, the ruled
group infers that the ruling group has less altruism toward the ruled group.
Equations (4) and (5) imply the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The distribution of the inferred degree of altruism and its expected
value shift downward as the metropolitan ruler’s exploitation increases. The
tyranny of the metropolitan ruler yields the ruled group’s suspicion against
the ruling group.
3.3 Second stage: After independence
In the second stage, the metropolitan ruler leaves the economy, and the
colony becomes independent. In this section, we investigate two situations.
In Section 3.3.1, we assume that Group 1 continues to be the ruling class and
controls the government. As explained in the previous section, it is often the
case that the privileged class in the colonial period persistently has political
power after independence. We also assume that Group 2 has an investment
opportunity but Group 1 can tax the return of it ex-post. Group 1 can exploit
the resources of Group 2, just as it did in the ﬁrst stage. This reﬂects the
extractive institutions of African states persisting from the colonial period,
which is argued in Acemoglu et al. (2001). Group 2 determines the level of
investment expecting how proportion of the return of investment is exploited
by Group 1.
In Section 3.3.2, although Group 1 occupies the ruling position at the
beginning of the stage, Group 2 can overturn the government of Group 1
before Group 1 decides the level of exploitation of the resources of Group 2.
In both cases, the optimal strategy of Group 2 depends on the policies
adopted by Group 1. Since the optimal policy for Group 1 depends on its
degree of altruism, which is private information of Group 1, the equilibrium
outcome depends on the belief of Group 2. We formulate a strategic rela-
tionship between Group 1 and Group 2 in the form of a Bayesian game and
assume that the belief of Group 2 is the one formed during the colonial pe-
riod. We investigate how the equilibrium outcome is related to the level of
exploitation by the metropolitan ruler during the colonial period through the
belief of Group 2.
103.3.1 Investment
We consider the situation where Group 2 has an investment opportunity such
that x amount of investment yields Rx amount of consumption goods.9 The
cost of the investment is given by c(x) = cx2
2 .
The government controlled by Group 1 taxes the income of Group 2 and
transfers the tax revenue to Group 1. Let t denote the tax rate, and assume
that the cost of taxation is given by t2
2∆y2, where y2 is the income of Group
2 and ∆ represents the eﬃciency of taxation. 10
Then, the resource constraint of each group is given by:






(e2 + Rx); (6)




The timing of events is as follows: 11
1. Group 2 decides the amount of investment x.
2. Group 1 (the government) decides the tax rate.
As in the ﬁrst stage, Group 1 (the government) maximizes the weighted
sum of the consumption of each group. Since the degree of altruism of Group
1, ¯¤, is the private information of Group 1, this game is a Bayesian game,
where the type (degree of altruism) of Group 1 is not known by Group 2.
We deﬁne the equilibrium by the pair of strategies (t(¯;x);x) satisfying
the following conditions.
(a) For any x, the tax rate t(¯;x) maximizes the payoﬀ of Group 1 of type
¯ given that Group 2 takes the strategy x.
(b) The strategy x maximizes the expected payoﬀ of Group 2, which is
evaluated based on the belief formed in the colonial period, given that
Group 1 takes the strategy t(¯;x).
9We ignore the investment opportunity of Group 1 for simplicity.
10The cost of taxation is represented by the same function as the cost of private ex-
ploitation in the ﬁrst stage. This is merely for simplicity and does not aﬀect the results
of this section.
11We derive the same results if the decisions are made simultaneously because the op-
timal strategy of Group 1 does not depend on the actions of Group 2, as explained in the
following text.
11The equilibrium corresponds to the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which
the belief of Group 2 about the type of Group 1 is the one formed in the
colonial period. Since Group 1 moves after observing the action of Group 2,
the strategy of Group 1 depends on both the type of Group 1 and the action
of Group 2.
After observing the amount of investment of Group 2, Group 1 of type ¯









(e2 + Rx) + ¯
µ




By the ﬁrst-order condition, the interior solution of the above problem is
given by:
8x t(¯;x) = ∆(1 ¡ ¯) ´ t(¯): (8)
As in the colonial period, the optimal tax rate which Group 1 sets negatively
depends on the degree of altruism, ¯. Note that the optimal tax rate does
not depend on the action of Group 2.
The belief of Group 2 about the type of Group 1 was formed in the
colonial period (i.e. the distribution given by (4)). Since Group 2 expects
that Group 1 of type ¯ sets the tax rate at t(¯) regardless of the amount of
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1 ¡ ∆(1 ¡ ¯
¤) ¡ ¿ +




Therefore, the equilibrium of the model is the pair of strategies satisfying (8)
and (9).
From Equation (9), the amount of investment is decreasing in ¿. This
is because the large amount of exploitation by the metropolitan ruler makes
Group 2 underestimate the degree of altruism and decreases the level of
investment since Group 2 expects a high tax rate.
12Proposition 1. The amount of investment of the ruled group after indepen-
dence is decreasing in the amount of exploitation by the metropolitan ruler
during the colonial period.
To evaluate economic performance after independence, we consider the
aggregate income of this economy, Y = c1+c2. From the resource constraint
of each group, Y can be written as:











Therefore, Y is strictly concave in x.
In order to focus on the eﬀect of exploitation by the metropolitan ruler
on aggregate income after independence, we ﬁx the tax rate at t = ∆(1¡¯¤),
which is chosen by Group 1 regardless of the amount of exploitation by the
metropolitan ruler.
Let ˜ x denote the amount of investment that maximizes the aggregate













Let xe denote the amount of investment that is achieved in the equilibrium,






1 ¡ ∆(1 ¡ ¯
¤) +





When the level of exploitation by the metropolitan ruler is suﬃciently large so
that ¿ >
¯ ¿+¿
2 and the degree of altruism takes a plausible value (¯¤ 2 (¡1;1)),
xe is less than ˜ x, and the distance between xe and ˜ x becomes larger as ¿ in-
creases. The large level of ¿ makes the belief of Group 2 about ¯¤ shift
downward, reducing the expected return of investment for Group 2 and low-
ering the level of xe. The harsh policy of the metropolitan ruler during the
colonial era causes the ruled group’s distrust of the ruling group as explained
in subsection 3.2. The distrust causes the ruled group to form pessimistic
expectations for the future exploitation of the ruling group, and such expec-
tations reduce the amount of investment. Since Y is strictly concave in x,
a larger distance between xe and ˜ x yields a larger loss of aggregate income.
Therefore, the larger the amount of exploitation by the metropolitan ruler,
the larger the loss of aggregate income after independence.
133.3.2 Revolt
In this section, we analyze how the experience in the colonial period aﬀects
political stability after independence. We focus on the situation where Group
1 continues to be the ruling class but Group 2 can challenge to overturn the
government controlled by Group 1 and establish a new government. As in
the previous sections, the group that controls the government can exploit
the resources of another group, and Group 2 takes over the belief from the
colonial period.
We consider the following game. First, Group 2 decides whether to revolt
against the government. If Group 2 decides to revolt against the government,
Group 2 can overturn it with probability one and control the new government
they established.12 Since the revolution involves destructive action and leads
to disorder, it decreases the endowments of each group to ¹ei, where ¹ 2
(0;1). The new government can choose tax rate on the resources of Group
1. On the other hand, if Group 2 decides not to revolt, Group 1 continues
to control the government.
The equilibrium of this game can be deﬁned in the same way as in the pre-
vious game, whereas the strategy of Group 2, x 2 fR;Pg, now represents the
choice of whether or not to revolt. The strategy R refers to a revolt against
Group 1 and the strategy P means subjection to the current government.










e2 + ¯(1 ¡ t)e2:
From the ﬁrst-order conditions, Group 1 with weight ¯ sets the tax rate at
t = ∆(1 ¡ ¯).
Therefore, when Group 2 does not revolt against Group 1, the expected
amount of consumption of Group 2, cP










1 ¡ ∆(1 ¡ ¯
¤) ¡ ¿ +




12The results of this section do not change if we introduce uncertainty about the success
of revolution.
14Note that the expected amount of consumption when Group 2 does not
revolt is decreasing in the amount of exploitation by the metropolitan ruler.
This is due to the same reason discussed in the previous section. A large
level of exploitation by the metropolitan ruler yields suspicion of Group 2
against Group 1, which makes Group 2 underestimate their expected amount
of consumption.
When Group 2 revolts against Group 1, Group 2 establishes a new gov-
ernment and exploits the income of Group 1. The tax rate set by Group 2 is














and the solution to this problem is t = ∆. Therefore, the amount of con-
sumption of Group 2 when they choose to revolt against Group 1, cR












Group 2 chooses to revolt against Group 1 if cR
2 > cP
2 (¿). Since cP
2 (¿)
is decreasing in ¿, there is a threshold ˜ ¿ which satisﬁes cR
2 = cP
2 (˜ ¿). That
is, when the amount of exploitation by the metropolitan ruler during the




2 (˜ ¿), ˜ ¿ can be written as:
˜ ¿ = 1 ¡ ∆(1 ¡ ¯
¤) +











Then, the action of Group 2 in equilibrium is as follows
² if ¿ > ˜ ¿, then Group 2 chooses to revolt against Group 1;
² if ¿ < ˜ ¿, then Group 2 chooses not to revolt against Group 1 and
endures the exploitation by Group 1.
Proposition 2. When the amount of exploitation by the metropolitan ruler
during the colonial period is suﬃciently large, the ruled group revolts against
the ruling group after independence.
15Proposition 2 showed that the ruled group rationally chooses revolt against
the government of ruling group if the ruled group has intense distrust of the
ruling group, which is caused by the harsh policy of the metropolitan ruler
during the colonial era. This is because the ruled group fears that the gov-
ernment of ruling group would extract a lot of resources of the ruled group.
The belief of ruled group, which is formed during the colonial period, aﬀects
such expectation.
3.4 The conﬂicts in Rwanda, Burundi, and Zanzibar
The implication of the model gives us one possible explanation for the con-
ﬂicts in Rwanda, Burundi, and Zanzibar. These nations were governed by
indirect rule, and the colonial experience created the ruled group’s distrust
of the ruling group, leading to a revolt against the ruling group just before
or after independence.
In Rwanda and Burundi, the German and Belgian colonial powers identi-
ﬁed the Tutsis and Hutus as diﬀerent groups although there were few cultural
diﬀerences between the two groups before colonial rule, and the colonial pow-
ers treated the former as superior to the latter.13 The colonial state delegated
the local authority to local chiefs and appointed the Tutsi elite to these posts.
The Tutsi elite occupying the posts of the chief abused their power to exploit
the inhabitants in their territory. As many researches have pointed out, these
colonial policies led to the friction between the Hutus and Tutsis (Adekanye
1996; Newbury 1988; Mamdani 2001; Takeuchi 2004).
After World War II, criticism against colonial rule by European countries
arose in the United Nations, and the Belgian colonial authority reformed
the governance structure to enhance the political participation of indigenous
people. This political reform enhanced the political power of the Hutus
because they made up a majority of the indigenous people, and conﬂict
between the Tutsi elite and the Hutus became overt. In 1959, a Hutu subchief
in Rwanda was killed by a supporter of the Union Nationale Rwandaise,
which was a political party representing the Tutsi elite, triggering widespread
violence by the Hutus toward the Tutsis. Although this turbulence was short-
lived, it drove many Tutsi elite to escape to neighboring countries. After this
13The boundary between the Tutsis and Hutus was not clear before colonial era, and,
in some regions, people were unconscious of the identity of the Tutsi or Hutu (Takeuchi
2004). Adekanye (1996) also stated that there were many cultural elements shared by the
Tutsis and Hutus before the colonial era.
16period of political instability, the administrative structure dominated by the
Tutsi elite changed completely, and the Hutu elite seized political power
following independence (Takeuchi 2004). In Burundi, the rule by the Tutsi
elite continued after independence. The Hutus attempted to revolt against
the rule by the Tutsi several times, but the revolts were repressed severely
by the government (Adekanye 1996; Uvin 1999).
The postcolonial history of Zanzibar is similar in structure to the ex-
perience in Rwanda and Brundi. In Zanzibar, the Arabs ruled over the
indigenous Africans from the 17th century, although the rule was nominal
and geographically restrictive during the majority of the precolonial period.
The superiority of the Arabs over the Africans was reinforced under British
rule after the 19th century (the formal British rule prevailed since 1890).
The relationship between the Arabs and Africans became more hierarchical,
and the indigenous authorities were replaced by Arab oﬃcials. Thus, the
autonomy of non-Arab indigenous groups was very restricted in the colo-
nial period. Zanzibar achieved independence in 1963. At ﬁrst, the Zanzibar
Nationalist party (ZNP), which represented the Arabs, controlled the gov-
ernment with the Zanzibar and Pemba People’s party (ZPPP). Immediately
after independence, military coup by the Africans occurred, the government
was overthrown, and the Arabs were eliminated from the country (Newbury
1983).
These cases are alike in that the metropolitan ruler gave superiority to
one group (Group 1 in the model) over the other group (Group 2 in the
model) and the ruled group revolted against the ruling group just before or
after independence. In these cases, the postcolonial conﬂict had its roots
in the colonial experience. The model presented in this paper can allow for
an interpretation of these cases as the result of rational choice based on the
belief that is endogenously linked to the colonial policy of the metropolitan
ruler. The Hutus in Rwanda and Burundi and Africans in Zanzibar formed
pessimistic expectations for the policy of post-independence government of
the ruling group due to the colonial experience, and such expectations led to
a revolt against the ruling group.
4 Conclusions
Recent empirical studies show an important connection between the history
of colonial rule and economic development after independence. In this paper,
17we developed a model to analyze this connection in African countries focusing
on the fact that many African countries were ruled by indirect rule during
the colonial era. Under indirect rule, the metropolitan ruler divides the
indigenous people into a privileged ruling group and an unprivileged ruled
group. The ruling group deprives the resources of the ruled group for both
themselves and the metropolitan ruler. Therefore, the ruled group cannot
observe how its deprived resources are divided between the metropolitan ruler
and the ruling group. Since the ruled group infers the degree of altruism
of the ruling group after observing the total amount of deprived resources,
large levels of exploitation by the metropolitan ruler yield the ruled group’s
distrust of the ruling group. We showed that such distrust among indigenous
groups could be a cause of underdevelopment and political instability in
postcolonial Africa. Interacting with poor institutions of postcolonial African
states, the expectation of the ruled group that the elite, who retain political
power from the colonial era, will extract their proﬁt decreases the amount
of investment by the ruled group. In some cases, such an expectation could
trigger a revolt of the ruled group against the ruling group. The model
presented here provides one possible explanation for the conﬂicts in Rwanda,
Burundi, and Zanzibar, where the postcolonial conﬂict was rooted in the
colonial experience.
In this paper, we assumed that independence is unexpected by the agents.
Since the consolidated authority of colonial states was unchallenged before
World War II, as stated in Young (2004), this assumption would be plausible
for the period before World War II. After World War II, however, inde-
pendence could be expected as stated in Young (2004). We still make this
assumption for the following reasons. 14
First, since the period where independence is unforeseeable makes up
the majority of colonial era, the legacies of this period are very important.
The foreseeability of independence matters only through the formation of
the beliefs of indigenous people in our model. Although our model does not
describe the the formation of beliefs in a dynamic manner, it will take a lot
14Even if the independence is expected to the ruling group, the key results of this paper
do not change when the ruling group is myopic. In the ﬁrst stage, the myopic agent thinks
little of the payoﬀ in the next stage, so the expectation of independence has little eﬀect
on the action in the ﬁrst stage. By similar logic, assuming that the agents in the second
stage are children of the agents in the ﬁrst stage and that the children take over the degree
of altruism and belief from their parents, who are assumed to have no altruism for their
children, we retain the main results of this paper.
18of time for beliefs to change in the real world. If change in beliefs takes a
lot of time to change, the experience before WWII would have a dominant
eﬀect on the beliefs of indigenous people in the postcolonial period, even if
the interaction among indigenous groups after WWII has some eﬀects on
beliefs. This is because the former period is longer.
Second, the assumption that independence is unexpected by the agents
allows us to show a very simple and clear mechanism. Incorporating the
interaction between indigenous groups during the period where independence
is foreseeable makes the analysis of this paper complicated. Of course, we
do not think that the period after World War II, where independence is
foreseeable, is unimportant, and analysis of the legacies of this period is left
for future work.
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